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INTRODUCTION
In the late 1950’s, Professor Henry M. Hart Jr. and Professor Albert M.
Sacks put forth the legal process theory and the principle of institutional
settlement.1 The principle of institutional settlement, proposes that when
decisions are made by an institution that has been granted competence to
make relevant decisions (such as a trial court or clemency board), and those
decisions are “arrived at [as a] result of duly established procedures . . . .”2
they “ought to be accepted as binding upon the whole society unless and
until they [the procedures] are [duly] changed.”3 The principle theorizes institutional decisions are legitimized by procedural consistency in the decision-making processes of that institution, rather than whether the institution’s decisions are substantively accurate.
The American Innocence Movement, propelled by the discovery of DNA
technology in the 1980s, however, has proven that “duly established procedures” utilized across the criminal justice system can (and do) generate substantively erroneous results.4 DNA technology has “shattered [a] perception
of virtual infallibility”5 and exposed the reality that factual error in the
criminal justice system is, as Findley puts it, “systemic, not just freakishly
rare or merely episodic.”6 Although, as of March 2016, 337 people in
America have been exonerated through DNA testing7 and other evidence
has provided relief to over 1200 individuals,8 the criminal justice system
continues to take a conservative approach towards providing relief. This
cautious approach is particularly apparent when concerns about the substantive accuracy of forensic science evidence used against a petitioner is questioned post-conviction. This is demonstrable upon examining the judicial
interpretation of legal claims based on arguments that forensic science iden-

1

William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of the Legal Process, 107 HARV. L. REV.
2031, 2031 (1994).
2
Id. at 2045.
3
See id.
4
DNA Exonerations Nationwide, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Mar. 17, 2016), http://www.innocenceproject
.org/free-innocent/improve-the-law/fact-sheets/dna-exonerations-nationwide.
5
Keith A. Findley, Innocence Found: Thee New Revolution in American Criminal Justice, in
CONTROVERSIES IN INNOCENCE CASES IN AMERICA 4 (Sarah Lucy Cooper ed., 2014).
6
Id.
7
See DNA Exonerations Nationwide, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Mar. 17, 2016), http://www.innocence
project.org/free-innocent/improve-the-law/fact-sheets/dna-exonerations-nationwide.
8
Univ. of Mich. Law School, The First 1,600 Exonerations, THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS,
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/1600_Exonerations.pdf (last visited Apr. 5,
2016).
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tification evidence used against a petitioner is unreliable and/or access to
DNA testing should be allowed.9
Petitioners pursue such claims through a variety of post-conviction relief
mechanisms. These mechanisms include (1) appellate frameworks allowing
challenges to the admissibility of allegedly unreliable forensic science identification evidence admitted at trial;10 (2) newly discovered evidence
frameworks that provide relief in the event that “new” and diligently discovered evidence of “shifting scientific opinion” has “verdict changing capacity”;11 and (3) appellate frameworks that facilitate claims for access to
DNA testing in order to, inter alia, support a petition for clemency.12 An
examination of relevant case law, however, reveals that such claims are
rarely successful.13
The courts’ conservative approach to these sorts of claims reveals a judicial fidelity to the legal process vision. In particular, the courts show a general willingness to (A) defer to the principle of institutional settlement i.e.,
preserve trial court decisions concerning forensic science evidence, jury
verdicts about guilt and the applications of state post-conviction procedures;
(B) protect ‘finality’ interests in order to foreclose claims for relief; (C) accept outcomes generated by rational procedures (despite such procedures
arguably being ill-suited for making accurate assessments about scientific
uncertainty); and (D) exalt form over substance when faced with scientific
uncertainty.14 Collectively these themes can sideline notions of substantive
accuracy.
This article confirms the existence of these legal process-centric themes
and considers some potential implications of these approaches. Part I briefly
sets out key tenets of the legal process vision and provides some background to the American Innocence Movement. Using examples from relevant case law, Part II examines the courts’ approaches thematically, demon-

9

See generally, Myrna S. Raeder, Post Convictions Claims of Innocence, 24 CRIM. JUST. (2009).
See Sarah Lucy Cooper, The Collision of Law and Science: American Court Responses to Developments in Forensic Science, 33 PACE L. REV. 234 (2013); see also Unreliable or Improper Forensic Science, INNOCENCE PROJECT http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Unreliable-Limited-Science
.php (last visited Apr. 16, 2016).
11
See Sarah Lucy Cooper, Judicial Responses to Shifting Scientific Opinion in Forensic Identification
Evidence and Newly Discovered Evidence Claims in the United States: The Influence of Finality and
Legal Process Theory, 4 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 649 (2015); see also Daniel G. Orenstein, Shaken to
the Core: Emerging Scientific Opinion and Post-Conviction Relief in Cases of Shaken Baby Syndrome,
42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1305 (2010-11).
12
See Sarah Lucy Cooper, Post-Conviction Access to DNA Testing and Clemency as a “Fail-Safe”: The
Implications of Judicial Fidelity to the Legal Process Vision, 64 DRAKE L. REV. 1 (2016).
13
See generally notes 10 –12.
14
See generally Raeder, supra note 9.
10
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strating how the courts exhibit loyalty to the legal process vision. It also
considers the implications of this loyalty, including that it can result in both
the extraction of science from its social context and an awkward approach
towards discerning between credible and incredible forensic science evidence of individualization, as well as represent a failure, by the courts, to
acknowledge the corrective justice function afforded to clemency by the
common law. Part III concludes that these approaches to judicial decisionmaking ultimately fail to accept the way in which new and credible evidence – particularly forensic science evidence – can cast legitimate doubt
on the verdict of a trial or, indeed, impact the proceedings of a clemency
board, “quite apart from any procedural defect.”15 In light of the American
Innocence Movement, the courts’ largely unreserved fidelity to the legal
process vision, in the context explored, is troublesome, and warrants new
approaches that are more sensitive to substantive accuracy.
I. KEY TENETS OF THE LEGAL PROCESS VISION AND THE RISE
OF THE AMERICAN INNOCENCE MOVEMENT
Legal Process Theory was conceived by Professor Henry M. Hart Jr. and
16
Professor Albert M. Sacks in the 1960s. At the center of that vision is the
principle of institutional settlement, which theorizes that it is procedural
regularity in the decision-making process of a competent institution that le17
gitimizes the institution’s decisions. The theory is primarily concerned
with appropriate institutions being granted competence to make relevant
decisions, and such institutions yielding their decisions via rational proce18
19
dures. Procedure is considered to be “critically important” because, inter
alia, it provides an effective way of obtaining “good” decisions, facilitates
the collaboration of institutions in an interconnected institutional system
(like the criminal justice system), and enhances the legitimacy of the law by
20
generating such qualities as consistency, stability and rationality. Ultimately, legal process theory thinking aims to preserve a competent institu-

15

David Wolitz, Innocence Commissions and the Future of Post-Conviction Review, 52 ARIZ. L. REV.
1027, 1060 (2010).
16
See generally Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1.
17
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707, 722 (1991).
18
Id. at 770.
19
Id. at 721.
20
Id. at 721–22.
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tion’s decisions that have been made through the application of rational
21
procedures.
The legal process vision is closely linked to the concept of finality. The
doctrine of finality developed out of a taxonomy detailed by Professor Paul
22
M. Bator in 1963. Bator argued that the finality of criminal judgments
serves important interests that are harmed by expansions of post-conviction
23
rights, and proposed that because we can never be 100 percent certain that
no error of law or fact was made during legal proceedings, “we must impose an end to litigation at some point or else the case could conceivably go
24
on ad infinitum.” As Popko summarizes,
Essentially, Bator argues we must acknowledge that human systems, because
fallible humans design them, are themselves inherently fallible. Thus, we must
“come to terms with the possibility of error inherent in any [human] process.”
The best way to deal with this probability of human error, he continues, is to
design our systems of justice with sufficient procedures and arrangements such
that there exists an “acceptable probability that justice will be done, that the
25
facts found will be ‘true’ and the law applied ‘correct.’

Bator answered the question of why the criminal justice system needs finality by considering a series of “very real” consequences of endless litiga26
tion. Decades later, the criminal justice system is familiar with the notion
that finality is not a singular “consequence” but rather shorthand for a collection of interests assumed to be furthered by any restrictions on post27
conviction review. These interests include ensuring respect for criminal
judgments, conserving state resources, furthering the efficiency and deterrent and educational functions of the criminal law, satisfying the human
need for closure, incentivizing defense counsel to “get it right first time,”
and preventing a flood of non-controversial claims from masking the fewer,
28
credible ones. Finality assumes that providing defendants broader post-

21

Id. at 722.
See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76
HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963).
23
Id. at 446–47.
24
Sigmund G. Popko, Putting Finality in Perspective: Collateral Review of Criminal Judgments in the
DNA Era, 1 L. J. SOC. JUST. 75, 76 (2011).
25
Id.
26
Id. at 77.
27
Andrew Chongseh Kim, Beyond Finality: How Making Criminal Judgments Less Final Can Further
the “Interests of Finality”, UTAH L. REV. 561, 568 (2013).
28
See Carrie Sperling, When Finality and Innocence Collide, in CONTROVERSIES IN INNOCENCE CASES
IN AMERICA 139 (Sarah Lucy Cooper ed., 2014); Bator, supra note 22, at 451–53; Henry J. Friendly, Is
Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 146–49
(1970); Kim, supra note 27.
22
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29

conviction rights harms these interests. Consequently, when considering
appeals, judges must balance society’s interests in finality against the rights
30
of defendants. Of course, finality does serve the interests of defendants
too, including their interests not to be subject to repetitive trials, to be able
to move on in their lives, and not to be ‘caught’ by repetitive state attempts
at trying a case (and its luck) that wear down the resources and stamina of
31
the defendant.
32

Legal process is the focal point of Bator’s taxonomy. According to Bator, the efficacy of outcomes produced by the criminal justice system (such
as jury verdicts, trial court decisions and clemency recommendations) require the application of a procedural model that provides “a reasoned and
33
acceptable probability that justice will be done.” When faced with postconviction challenges, therefore, process thinkers ask such questions as: did
the processes of the trial court give the petitioner a full and fair opportunity
to confront the case against him and present his own case? And, did the social actors within that process act in accordance with those procedures? If
so, legal process dictates the outcome is legitimate (whether it is substan34
tively accurate or not). Legal process thinkers look for rational decision35
making and procedural regularity. Consequently, the process model simultaneously protects finality interests by restricting the means available to
usurp a rationally processed conviction. This approach underpins post36
conviction frameworks across America, and courts “have fully embraced
37
the concept of finality.”
However, the efficacy of these process-centric approaches (as blanket
approaches, that is) in the Era of Innocence is questionable. The discovery
of DNA technology in the 1980s and the subsequent understanding that this
forensic science discipline could, with unrivalled levels of scientific cer-

29

Kim, supra note 27, at 572–73.
Kim, supra note 27, at 612–13.
31
Laurie L. Levenson, Searching for Injustice: The Challenge of Postconviction Discovery, Investigation, and Litigation, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 545, 552–53 (2014).
32
See Gabriel A. Carrera, Section 1983 & The Age of Innocence: The Supreme Court Carves a Procedural Loophole for Post-Conviction DNA Testing in Skinner v. Switzer, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 431, 440
(2011) (noting that Bator’s taxonomy has been referred to as “Bator’s Process View”).
33
Bator, supra note 22, at 448.
34
Carrera, supra note 32.
35
See Eskridge & Peller, supra note 17, at 709–10, 738.
36
Sperling, supra note 28.
37
Popko, supra note 24, at 77.
30
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tainty and consistency, prove both innocence and guilt, kick-started signifi38
cant changes in the American criminal justice system.
In 1992, Barry C. Scheck and Peter J. Neufeld formed The Innocence
Project “to assist prisoners who could be proven innocent through DNA
testing.”39 By the end of 1993, 135 people had been exonerated, including
14 whose innocence had been conclusively proven by post-conviction DNA
evidence.40 Over the last two decades, the number of DNA exonerations has
continued to grow, along with an increased understanding of the propensity
41
of the criminal justice system to generate factual errors. The concept of
“innocence” is now a burgeoning feature of legal, social and political dis42
course, with the Innocence Movement being described as “the most dramatic development in the criminal justice world since the Warren Court’s
43
Due Process Revolution of the 1960s.”
As of March 2016, post-conviction DNA testing in America had exonerated 337 people, and the capacity of DNA technology to identify specific
sources consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, has been rigor44
ously tested. DNA evidence has become a gold-standard, raising the bar
for what is scientifically acceptable for engaging in “individualization” i.e.,
45
identifying a source to the exclusion of all others. In particular, DNA
technology has exposed the fallibility of numerous so-called ‘soft’ science
46
forensic disciplines – such as tool-mark, bite-mark and microscopic hair

38

THE COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. CMTY. ET AL., STRENGTHENING THE
FORENSIC SCIENCES IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 40 (2009) [hereinafter NRC REPORT],
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf.
39
Our Work, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/free-innocent (last visited Apr. 5,
2016).
40
See Univ. of Mich. Law School, supra note 8.
41
Richard A. Leo & Jon B. Gould, Studying Wrongful Convictions: Learning from Social Science, 7
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, 9, 13 (2009).
42
See Improve the Law: Policy, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/free-innocent/
improve-the-law/legislative-reform (last visited Apr. 5, 2016); see also Keith A. Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 ALBANY L. REV. 1157, 1157–1158 (2011); see also CONTROVERSIES IN INNOCENCE CASES IN
AMERICA (Sarah Lucy Cooper ed., 2014).
43
Findley, supra note 5, at 1.
44
INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 7; NRC REPORT, supra note 38, at 7.
45
Cooper, supra note 10, at 235-236; NRC REPORT, supra note 38, at 7.
46
It is worth noting that the labeling of these disciplines as ‘soft’ sciences is not an official label, although I use the label in this article to reflect the approach of many courts to name them as such. Traditional soft sciences include disciplines such as psychology and anthropology, and traditional hard sciences include disciplines such as chemistry and physics. The disciplines given as examples at this
footnote do not fall neatly into either category. DNA analysis, of course, would be a ‘hard science’,
however. See Sarah Lucy Cooper, Forensic Identification Evidence: Tensions Between Law and Science, J. PHIL. SCI. & L. 1 (2016) available at http://jpsl.org/files/7814/6014/5245/ForensicScience
Identification.pdf (“Alongside the application of traditional hard and soft science disciplines to aid the
solving of crime are a vast array of forensic science identification techniques . . . These disciplines do
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analysis – with forty-seven percent of the wrongful convictions that led to
the known 337 DNA exonerations being attributed, in some way, to unreli47
able and/or improper forensic evidence.
This revelation, in particular, has presented the criminal justice system
with a complex challenge due to the long established role of forensic science identification evidence in the criminal justice process. Throughout the
20th and 21st centuries, American courts have embraced the notion that a
plethora of ‘soft’ forensic science disciplines can engage in individualiza48
tion. For instance, courts have routinely accepted that fingerprints can
uniquely identify the perpetrator of a crime, suspect notes can be “matched”
to a suspect’s handwriting, bite-marks on a victim can be “matched” to a
suspect’s teeth, ammunition from a suspect’s gun can be “matched” to suspect ammunition, and a suspect’s vehicle tires, shoes and hairs can be
49
“matched” to prints and hairs left at a crime scene respectively. In short,
the hard science of DNA analysis has undermined the ‘soft’ science staples
of the criminal justice system – calling into question decades of convictions
in its wake.
This observation was formally recognized in 2009 when the National
Academy of Sciences (NAS) produced a landmark report—Strengthening
Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward (2009 NRC Re50
port). This report acknowledged how the forensic science identification
methods routinely serviced the criminal justice process in terms of crime51
solving, but also how they may be responsible for some known wrongful
52
convictions. Most significantly, the report made the unprecedented conclusion that “with the exception of DNA analysis . . . no forensic method
has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a

not fall neatly into either category.” Id. at 2.
The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/causeswrongful-conviction (last visited Apr. 5, 2016).
48
See Jane Campbell Moriarty & Michael J. Saks, Forensic Science: Grand Goals, Tragic Flaws, and
Judicial Gatekeeping, 44 JUDGES J. 16, 29 (2005) (considering the role of judges in admitting forensic
evidence).
49
See generally Cooper, supra note 10 (considering how American courts have responded to developments in forensic science by focusing on fingerprint identification, firearms identification, bite mark
identification, and arson investigations).
50
Simon A. Cole & Gary Edmond, Science Without Precedent: The Impact of the National Research
Council Report on the Admissibility and use of Forensic Science Evidence in the United States, 4 BRIT.
J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 585, 587 (2015). “Strengthening changed the nature of the controversy because it
could reasonably be represented as a quasi-official utterance of the American scientific establishment in
a way that complemented, or perhaps eclipsed, the conclusions of both individual scientists and selforganized collectives who had been raising their own concerns.” Id. at 588.
51
NRC REPORT, supra note 38, at 86.
52
NRC REPORT, supra note 38, at 4.
47
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high degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence and a
53
specific individual or source.” This conclusion casts all the aforementioned ‘soft’ forensic science “matches” in a sharp, critical light, and soon
after the report was published, the United States Supreme Court acknowl54
edged that many forensic sciences are subject to “serious deficiencies.”
An increased awareness of the fallibilities of many ‘soft’ forensic science disciplines has led petitioners, convicted in whole or part by such evidence, to pursue post-conviction challenges to the relevant evidence used
55
against them. Petitioners have done this through various appellate mechanisms. These mechanisms include procedures that allow (1) challenges to
the admissibility of such evidence; (2) claims that the indeterminacy surrounding these disciplines qualifies as newly discovered evidence; and (3)
claims for access to DNA testing on evidence existing in their case that
56
might, inter alia, assist a petition for clemency.
An examination of relevant case law, however, reveals that such chal57
lenges are rarely successful. It also presents a generally robust judicial fidelity to the legal process vision. Part II examines the influence of legal
process theory in this context, extracting general themes from the judiciary’s decision-making and highlighting possible implications of this legal
process-centric rationale.
II. THE INFLUENCE OF LEGAL PROCESS THEORY: GENERAL
THEMES AND IMPLICATIONS
The courts’ approaches to the aforementioned post-conviction challenges
related to soft science identification evidence and access to DNA testing,
demonstrate four general themes in judicial decision-making. These themes
showcase an allegiance, by the courts, to the legal process vision. These
themes are: (A) a deference to the principle of institutional settlement (B)
the protection of ‘finality’ interests; (C) an acceptance of outcomes generated by rational procedures (despite such procedures being ill-suited for
making accurate assessments about scientific uncertainty); and (D) an exaltation of form over substance when faced with indeterminacy. Using exam-

53

NRC REPORT, supra note 38, at 7.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 319 (2009).
55
See Cole & Edmond, supra note 50, at 592.
56
See generally notes 10–12.
57
See generally notes 10–12; see also Jules Epstein, Preferring the “Wise Man” to Science: The Failure
of Courts and Non-Litigation Mechanisms to Demand Validity in Forensic Matching Testimony, 20
WIDENER L. REV. 81, 101 (2014).
54
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ples from relevant case law, Part II explores these themes and highlights
relevant implications.
A. DEFERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF INSTITUTIONAL
SETTLEMENT
The principle of institutional settlement theorizes that procedural regularity in the decision-making processes of a competent institution legitimizes
58
the institution’s decisions, and thereby ultimately aims to preserve a competent institution’s rational decisions as generated by rational procedures.
Fidelity to this principle is evident in cases where courts have rejected
claims for access to DNA testing that could support, inter alia, a petition for
clemency. This approach has gained momentum by way of the seminal case
in this domain: District Attorney's Office of the Third Judicial District v.
59
Osborne. In Osborne, the Supreme Court of the United States declined to
60
“constitutionalize the issue [of access to DNA testing].” The majority
found there was no freestanding due process right to DNA testing; and in61
stead found, “a qualified, derivative” procedural due process right to
DNA testing based on “a liberty interest in demonstrating…innocence with
62
new evidence under state law.” The Court bluntly rejected the argument
that Osborne had a due process right to DNA testing derived from the lib63
erty interest he had in the context of clemency,
and applied precedent
from a previous decision stating that, “noncapital defendants do not have a
liberty interest in traditional state executive clemency, to which no particu64
lar claimant is entitled as a matter of state law.” Under the Court’s decision, Osborne was precluded from challenging the constitutionality of any
65
procedures available to vindicate an interest in state clemency.
The principle of institutional settlement drove the majority decision. This
is shown in a number of ways. First, the fact that Alaska provided an adequate statute for obtaining post-conviction access to DNA evidence, which
Osborne had neglected to utilize, meant he could not challenge the process
66
as applied to him. This feature of the decision is indicative of the majority
58

See HENRY M HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 4 (1994).
59
Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (2009).
60
Id. at 56.
61
Brandon L. Garrett, DNA and Due Process, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2919, 2921 (2010).
62
Osborne, 557 U.S. at 68.
63
Id. at 67.
64
Id. at 67–68 (applying Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981)).
65
Id. at 68.
66
Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 70–71 (2009).
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analyzing Osborne’s claim as an issue of institutional settlement. As one
scholar explains:
The existence of Alaska procedures to obtain post conviction DNA testing
formed the opinion's “starting point in analyzing Osborne's constitutional
claims.” After finding “nothing inadequate” about Alaska's procedures, the
Court deliberately echoed Wilkinson in declining to “short-circuit” state legislative activity. In the end, the majority did not find DNA's accuracy relevant to
a debate it sees as fundamentally about the morality of federal courts overriding
67
state processes.

Second, the Osborne majority believed there was a “dilemma [about]
how to harness DNA's power to prove innocence without unnecessarily
68
overthrowing the established system of criminal justice,” which was un69
derpinned by “traditional notions of finality.” Concerns about undermining the principle of institutional settlement are reflected in the Court's desire
to maintain the trial as the “main event in which the issue of guilt or inno70
cence can be fairly resolved.” By couching the issue in these terms “the
Court implied that DNA's truth-telling power must somehow be constrained
to fit into our existing system as opposed to allowing the system to change
71
in response to the unique power of DNA evidence.” In other words, a
constitutional right to DNA testing does not fit the legal process vision because it undermines the efficacy of the criminal justice system, despite the
application of its thousands of procedures and measures.
Third, the Supreme Court observed the institutional competence of the
political branches of state governments to determine how the law should
address new technological developments: “[t]he elected governments of the
States are actively confronting the challenges DNA technology poses to our
criminal justice systems and our traditional notions of finality, as well as the
72
opportunities it affords.” The Court worried that to constitutionalize this
area suddenly would short-circuit “a prompt and considered legislative re73
sponse” i.e., shirk the principle of institutional settlement.

67

Colin Starger, The DNA of an Argument: A Case Study in Legal Logos, 99 NW. J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1045, 1099-1100 (2009) (citations omitted).
68
Osborne, 557 U.S. at 62.
69
Id. at 72.
70 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 506 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
71
Jason Kreag, Letting Innocence Suffer: The Need for Defense Access to the Law Enforcement DNA
Database, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 805, 846 (2015).
72
Osborne, 557 U.S. at 72–73.
73
Id. at 71.

222

RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

[Vol. XIX:iii

Osborne’s legal process-centric precedent has led to the systemic rejec74
tion of similar challenges by the lower courts, with numerous courts actively applying the principle of institutional settlement to rationalize their
decisions. For example, in Vaughn v. Office of the Judge for the Third Circuit Court, the petitioner made a variety of due process claims, including
that that he had been prevented from proving his actual innocence and fur75
thering a clemency application by being denied access to DNA evidence.
The U.S. District Court determined, however, that his clemency claim was
76
barred. All that remained for Vaughn was the possibility of an attack on
the fairness and/or application of the state’s DNA testing statute, which he
77
had failed to make. The court found “that pleading failure cannot be cured
because the Michigan statute reasonably balances the competing interests of
the convicted person's right to pursue DNA evidence and testing with the
78
state's right to maintain an orderly criminal justice system.” In other
words, even without close examination, the state regime preserved the traditional notions of justice at the center of the majority’s concern in Osborne.
Similarly, in Gary v. Humphrey, Gary motioned for DNA testing after
79
being denied clemency by the state parole board. The motion was granted
for certain evidence (with the court concluding that such testing may be
relevant to a state clemency application), and compensation for Gary’s
80
counsel and for a DNA expert was approved. Based upon the DNA test
results, Gary pursued a second state clemency hearing simultaneously with
81
an extraordinary motion for new trial in state court. Gary’s counsel submitted vouchers for services related to the second clemency proceeding and
82
new trial motion. The court approved compensation for services connected with the clemency proceeding, but denied compensation for services

74

See supra note 12.
Vaughn v. Office of the Judge for the Third Circuit Court, No. 14-CV-10458, 2015 WL 404254, at *1
(E.D. Mich. Jan. 29, 2015).
76
Id. at *3. This was by way of Heck v. Humphrey 512 U.S. 477 (1994), a decision by the Supreme
Court that determined that a state prisoner cannot make a cognizable claim under § 1983 for an alleged
unconstitutional conviction, or for harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, unless he first shows that his conviction or sentence had been reversed on direct
appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Id.
77
Id. at *7.
78
Id. at *9.
79
Gary v. Humphrey, No. 4:97-CV-181 (CDL), 2011 WL 205772, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 21, 2011).
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
75
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related solely to the new trial. Gary appealed that decision to a U.S. District
83
Court, which denied his appeal.
Although the District Court’s decision, by implication, agrees that a
clemency hearing (particularly one including potential exculpatory DNA
evidence) is sufficiently important to warrant state funded counsel, it also
continues the cautious, process-sensitive trend demonstrated by the other
courts. This is because the court made a point in its judgment to narrow the
84
decision under a specially labeled “Future Guidance” section. In that section, the court first stated it was not convinced that providing counsel to
pursue DNA testing subsequent to the final dismissal of a federal habeas
petition, even if it is to be used in support of clemency relief, was manda85
tory under federal law. Second, it underscored that its decision to fund
counsel did “not include a legal right to DNA testing to be used to support a
86
clemency petition.” In other words, it was not at odds with the Osborne
decision. Third, the court was careful to acknowledge the principle of institutional settlement. It did so both by affirming that the right to DNA testing
87
was a “limited right under Georgia law” and by underscoring that its decision did not undermine that regime, as,
While the results [of the DNA testing] may also be used in a second clemency
hearing, there is no statutory right to obtain those results for use in a clemency
hearing, nor is there any statutory right to use them once they are obtained. The
fact that they may be available for such future use in the clemency hearing is
88
completely fortuitous.

The courts’ approach in this context has a number of implications. First,
it undermines the corrective justice function of clemency. In Herrera v.
89
90
Collins, the Court stated clemency is the “fail-safe” of the criminal jus91
tice system and the traditional remedy for miscarriages of justice. In Herrera, and in subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court has placed great
92
93
weight and faith in the clemency process” to remedy innocence claims,
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Gary v. Humphrey, No. 4:97–CV–181 (CDL), 2011 WL 205772, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 21, 2011).
Id. at *7.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Gary v. Humphrey, No. 4:97-CV-181 (CDL), 2011 WL 205772, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 21, 2011).
89
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
90
Id. at 415.
91
Id. at 411–12.
92
Ryan Dietrich, A Unilateral Hope: Reliance on the Clemency Process as a Trigger for a Right of Access to State-Held DNA Evidence, 62 MD. L. REV. 1028, 1044 (2003).
93
Id. SCOTUS consistently affirmed the importance of the clemency process in ensuring the integrity of
the criminal justice system. Moreover, numerous courts have rationalized their decisions not to grant
84
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so much so that Professor Austin Sarat now considers gubernatorial clem94
ency to be “the court of last resort” for innocents. As a consequence, a
right to a meaningful clemency process should be recognized, and part of
this substance should be the opportunity to present exculpatory DNA evidence, if it exists. As one scholar comments,
In relying on the clemency process to fulfill an articulated and unique position
in the criminal justice system, it is imperative that the Court uphold and maintain the integrity of the process. Therefore, the Court must ensure that prisoners
have the tools necessary to present a meaningful petition to the clemency
authority. Part of this meaningful ability to access the clemency process should
be the ability to access state-held evidence for the purposes of modern DNA
95
testing.

Moreover, such provision would encourage executives with decisionmaking powers to be both more accurate and confident in making proclemency decisions. A shift towards tough-on-crime politics has effectively
blinded the system to innocence claims, by fueling antipathetic executive
attitudes towards clemency and encouraging narrow interpretations of what
96
can be done using the clemency power. Thus, if a petitioner can access
and test DNA evidence, and the results of such testing are exculpatory in
some credible way, designing the constitutional framework to ensure that
such evidence is presented to the executive is imperative. In other words,
the constitutional framework should mandate state procedures that require,
when available, that DNA evidence be presented in clemency proceedings.

“actual innocence” claims on the basis that a clemency process existed in the relevant jurisdictions. Id. at
n.143 “(See Royal v. Taylor, 188 F.3d 239, 243 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that because Virginia has a
clemency process available to the prisoner, “we cannot grant [the prisoner] the requested habeas relief
based simply on his assertion of actual innocence due to newly discovered evidence”); Lucas v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 1069, 1074–76 (5th Cir. 1998) (interpreting the Herrera language to automatically preclude the existence of an actual innocence claim whenever the executive clemency process is available);
Herrera, 506 U.S. at 428 (Scalia, J., concurring) (refusing to create a free-standing claim of actual innocence based partly on the notion that “it is improbable that evidence of innocence as convincing as today's opinion requires would fail to produce an executive pardon”)).”
94
Austin Sarat, Memorializing Miscarriages of Justice: Clemency Petitions in the Killing State, 42 LAW
& SOC'Y REV. 183, 185 (2008).
95
Dietrich, supra note 92, at 1045. Notably the principle of institutional settlement has driven rejections
to due process challenges to administrative board decisions in the context of clemency too. See Corliss
v. Pennsylvania Board of Pardons and Parole, No. 4:CV-05-1817, 2006 WL 2927270 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 11,
2006). In that case, Corliss challenged the Board’s decision to deny him parole, alleging that in the light
of exculpatory DNA evidence, the refusal violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The
court rejected his claim, stating that Corliss presented no basis to his conclusion that DNA evidence
proved his innocence. The fact that the relevant evidence had been properly rejected by his trial court as
inconclusive meant Corliss’ claim lacked merit. Id.
96
See generally, Sarah Lucy Cooper & Daniel Gough, The Controversy of Clemency and Innocence in
America, 51 CAL. W. L. REV. 55 (2014).
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Although this would naturally undermine prior juror verdicts and trial
court decisions, it would be a regime that ultimately favored and delivered
the closest approximation of substantive accuracy that science can currently
offer. It would also allow the executive to underpin his or her decision by
way of this evidence, which is, at present, the most reliable individualiza97
tion evidence science can offer. A decision to grant clemency in such circumstances would not be ‘soft’ on crime, but simply a decision rooted in
what is scientifically most accurate. As the dissent in Osborne pointed out,
98
DNA is “uniquely precise” and unrivaled in its ability to ascertain the
99
“truth.” Decisions underpinned by scientific evidence in this way would
serve to strengthen the efficacy of the criminal justice system, not undermine it, as decisions that are likely more accurate are naturally morelegitimate in the context of criminal process. Moreover, these decisions
would be the product of a rationalized procedure designed at state level,
thereby satisfying the principle of institutional settlement. As Dietrich explains, “The Supreme Court has recognized that unless a state provides an
additional remedy, clemency is the sole remedy for the constitutionally
convicted yet innocent prisoner. Therefore, certain safeguards must exist to
ensure that an actually innocent prisoner has the ability to properly commu100
nicate his innocence to the appropriate authority.”
Second, the courts’ legal process-centric approach demonstrates an
awkward approach to discerning between credible and less credible individualization evidence. At the time Osborne was decided, the capabili-

ties of DNA were making waves throughout the criminal justice system, not only with regards to the access and testing of DNA evidence,
but also with regard to how it exposed the frailties of other forensic
methods employed widely in the criminal justice system.101
In February 2009 (three months before the Osborne decision) the
National Academy of Sciences had published the NRC Report, 102 which
had made the unprecedented conclusion that DNA was the only forensic
method that had been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently,
103
and with a high degree of certainty, engage in individualization.
The
message was simple: “In a number of forensic science disciplines, forensic

97

NRC REPORT, supra note 38, at 7.
Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 87–88 (2009).
99
Id.
100
Dietrich, supra note 92, at 1052.
101
Jacqueline McMurtrie, Swirls and Whorls: Litigating Post Conviction Claims of Fingerprint Misidentification After the NAS Report, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 267 (2010).
102
Id.
103
NRC REPORT, supra note 38, at 7.
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science professionals have yet to establish either the validity of their approach or the accuracy of their conclusions, and the courts have been utterly
104
ineffective in addressing this problem.”
However, generally, the NRC Report (and other catalogued criticism of
105
forensic identification evidence) has had limited impact in practice.
In
particular, it has failed to turn the heads of the judiciary when it comes to
the admissibility of forensic identification evidence. Despite the NRC Report’s findings, trial judges continue to admit, often unreservedly, forensic
106
identification evidence that engages with individualization.
These courts also apply the principle of institutional settlement to rationalize their decisions, as they routinely defer to trial court applications of
107
Daubert. They also interpret the Daubert factors inconsistently, and reject the idea that the NRC Report, in particular, has any significant impact
108
on the admissibility of such evidence. This routine approach has generated a body precedent that is seemingly impenetrable. Moreover, it reflects
fidelity to the legal process vision because “horizontal precedent is gener109
ally consistent with legal process theories…”
A commitment to precedent is also considered fundamental to traditional process thinkers because
they emphasize the positivist features of that philosophy, namely “its commitment to neutrality and neutral principles, the principle of institutional
settlement, and the importance of continuity, precedent, and tradition in
110
law.”
In fact, the American common law system’s commitment to the principle
of stare decisis leads to this sort of body of precedent being able to naturally preserve itself. For instance, “if a judge knows that precedent dictates
that individualization testimony by bite-mark examiners is admissible evi-

104

NRC REPORT, supra note 38, at 53.
Cole & Edmond, supra note 50, at 589.
106
See generally Cooper, supra note 10.
107
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). SCOTUS made trial judges the
gate-keepers of expert evidence. Daubert charges judges to examine the principles and methodology of
proffered scientific evidence. In Daubert, SCOTUS listed five key factors courts should consider when
analyzing the reliability of expert testimony: (1) whether a method can or has been tested; (2) the known
or potential rate of error; (3) whether the methods have been subjected to peer review; (4) whether there
are standards controlling the technique's operation; and (5) the general acceptance of the method within
the relevant community. Id. At present, Daubert (generally) governs the admissibility of scientific expert
evidence in America.
108
See generally Cooper, supra note 10.
109
Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1457, 1470
(2003).
110
Robert F. Blomquist, The Good American Legislator: Some Legal Process Perspectives and Possibilities, 38 AKRON L. REV. 895, 928 (2005).
105
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dence, he is likely to (at least as a starting position) reason that all individu111
alization evidence by all bite-mark examiners is admissible.”
State v.
112
Brooks
highlights such an approach. In Brooks, despite concerns about
the credibility of the state’s expert, and the fact other experts found inconsistencies between the bite-mark on the victim and Brooks’ teeth, the majority of the court took the chance, on the basis of precedent, to “state affirmatively that bite mark identification evidence is admissible in
113
Mississippi.”
The author has previously concluded the application of
such a broad-brush approach “avoids an immediate examination and discourages a future examination of the substance of the tension between law
114
and science in this context.” As Beecher-Monas has found:
When defense counsel do challenge bite-mark testimony, they are rarely successful. Courts simply decline to engage in any serious analysis of these challenges. By far the most widely used gate-keeping avoidance technique that
judges employ is admitting bite-mark evidence because other courts have done
so. Rather than engage in any analysis of the scientific principles on which the
testimony is based, the data underlying the testimony, the methodology, error
rate, or general acceptance by the scientific community, these courts skirt the
115
entire issue . . . .

The general approach of the judiciary to routinely reject claims that center on the case of Osborne, therefore, highlights an interesting paradox. On
the one hand, the judiciary continue to favor individualization evidence
from a variety of crime-solving ‘soft’ forensic science disciplines – despite
such practices being significantly criticized for lacking, at present, adequate
116
scientific underpinning. On the other hand, the courts are comfortable in
taking a comparably conservative approach to questions concerning access
to DNA testing.
This is a sharp (and troubling) contrast because DNA is undoubtedly
more scientifically qualified to engage in individualization than other foren117
sic science identification methods. DNA analysis has been subject to rig118
orous evaluation standards from the beginning.
Numerous institutions
funded and conducted extensive basic research, followed by applied research, and serious studies on DNA analysis preceded the establishment and

111

Cooper, supra note 46, at 10.
Brooks v. State, 748 So. 2d 736 (Miss. 1999).
113
Id. at 739.
114
Cooper, supra note 46, at 10.
115
Erica Beecher-Monas, Reality Bites: The Illusion of Science in Bite-Mark Evidence, 30 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1369, 1395 (2009).
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Id. at 1395–96.
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NRC REPORT, supra note 38, at 101.
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NRC REPORT, supra note 38, at 101.
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implementation of “individualization” criteria and parameters for assessing
119
the probative value of claims of individualization. The NRC Report set
out this distinction clearly,
This history stands in sharp contrast to the history of research involving most
other forensic science disciplines, which have not benefitted from extensive basic research, clinical applications, federal oversight, vast financial support from
the private sector for applied research, and national standards for quality assurance and quality control. The goal is not to hold other disciplines to DNA’s
high standards in all respects; after all, it is unlikely that most other current forensic methods will ever produce evidence as discriminating as DNA. However, the least that the courts should insist upon from any forensic discipline is
certainty that practitioners in the field adhere to enforceable standards, ensuring
that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant,
120
but reliable.

The courts are not meaningfully acknowledging this contrast. At present,
the judiciary is supporting the use of what we know to be less reliable individualization evidence, and hampering the use of the most credible indi121
vidualization evidence. And, ironically, both approaches are underpinned
by a fidelity to the legal process vision.
B. THE PROTECTION OF FINALITY INTERESTS
Finality is an umbrella term used to cover a variety of “interests” alleg122
edly furthered by restricting post-conviction relief.
These interests include: ensuring respect for criminal judgments and victims’ rights, conserving state resources, furthering the efficiency and deterrent and educational
functions of the criminal law, satisfying the human need for closure, incentivizing defense counsel to “get it right first time,” and preventing a flood of
123
non-controversial claims from masking the fewer, credible ones.
The doctrine of finality made up by the courts’ preservation of these interests is underpinned by the legal process vision. This is because the notion
of finality was conceived in the spirit that the efficacy of outcomes produced by the criminal justice system requires the application of a procedural
model that provides “a reasoned and acceptable probability that justice will
124
be done.” Thus, if a rational process (absent procedural error) generates a

119

NRC REPORT, supra note 38, at 101.
NRC REPORT, supra note 38, at 117–18.
121
E.g., NRC REPORT, supra note 38, at 103.
122
Kim, supra note 27 at 563–64.
123
See generally, Sperling, supra note 28; Bator, supra note 22; Friendly, supra note 28; Kim, supra
note 27.
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Bator, supra note 22, at 448.
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conviction; that conviction is legitimate in the eyes of process thinkers.
Appeals seeking to undermine such rationally generated convictions are to
be narrowly construed, and, thus, the appellate process naturally protects
finality interests by narrowing avenues for relief.
Concerns about disturbing finality interests have played a direct role in
numerous Supreme Court decisions relevant to this article. For instance, in
126
Osborne, the majority were restrained by the “dilemma” DNA presented
127
to America’s “established system of justice”, signaling that its decision
was underpinned by concerns that the creation of a constitutional right to
access DNA for testing would too severely undermine “traditional notions”
128
of finality.
129

The decision in Herrera was similarly underpinned.
Writing for the
majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that allowing actual innocence
to stand solely as a ground for federal habeas relief would have a “very dis130
ruptive effect…on the need for finality” , and was mindful of the “enormous burden that having to retry cases based on often stale evidence would
131
place on the States…” At some point in time, the majority opined, “the
State's interest in finality must outweigh the prisoner's interest in yet an132
other round of litigation.”
The Court further remarked that, if a petitioner was to have a freestanding right to make an actual innocence claim,
133
the threshold for relief would “necessarily be extraordinarily high.” This
rationale drew upon a fundamental “interest” of finality, namely the prevention of frivolous claims flooding the appellate system and masking the
fewer, credible claims. Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded, “If the federal
courts are to entertain claims of actual innocence, their attention, efforts,
and energy must be reserved for the truly extraordinary case; they ought not
134
be forced to sort through the insubstantial and the incredible as well.”

125

See Bator, supra note 22, at 448.
Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 at 62.
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Id. at 72.
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See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993). For further comment on the influence of finality on
clemency see Sarah Lucy Cooper, The State Clemency Power and Innocence Claims: The Influence of
Finality and its Implications for Innocents, 6 CHARLOTTE L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (on file with
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An active, yet somewhat veiled, protection of finality interests by the
courts is evident in decisions rejecting challenges concerning, in particular,
the veracity of firearms identification evidence (especially those made sub135
sequent to the NRC Report). When rejecting such challenges, the courts
rely on two particular finality interests, namely preventing noncontroversial claims from flooding the system and incentivizing defense
136
counsel. In relation to preventing non-controversial claims flooding the
system, courts often conclude that the admission of such evidence was
137
“non-prejudicial” in light of other evidence against the petitioner.
In
other words, the courts are terming the (legally sound or unsound) admission of firearms identification evidence as non-controversial and implying
such evidence is of inconsequential impact on the jury. In relation to incentivizing defense counsel, the courts emphasize the importance of the adversarial system, highlighting that it is the role of defense counsel to weed out
frailties in forensic evidence through cross-examination, and the function of
the jury to assess the credibility and weight of such evidence after that
138
process.
Notably, courts also, in particular, draw upon the ‘incentivizing
defense counsel’ finality interest in order to rationalize rejections to chal139
lenges to the veracity of fingerprint identification evidence.
In those
cases, the courts indicate a belief that that the adversarial system will function to “resolve and neutralize” any post–NRC Report concerns about the
140
reliability of fingerprint evidence.
These approaches can be problematic, however. This is largely because
they divorce the relevant ‘science’ from its social context by overlooking
the difficulties that the social actors involved in the adversarial model – in
particular lawyers and jurors – can have in handling scientific evidence accurately. As Faigman puts it, as consumers of science, lawyers (and jurors,
judges and extended legal personnel), “have very little understanding of the
141
product they are buying.”

See generally, Sarah Lucy Cooper, Judicial Responses to Challenges to FirearmsIdentification Evidence: A Need for New Judicial Perspectives on Finality, 31 T.M. COOLEY L. REV.
457, 458–88 (2014).
136
Id.
137
Id. at 460.
138
Id. at 471.
139 See generally Sarah Lucy Cooper, Challenges to Fingerprint Identification Evidence: Why the
Courts Need a New Approach to Finality, 42 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. (forthcoming 2016); see also
Kim, supra note 27, 564.
140
See Cooper, supra note 139.
141
DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE LAW 53 (1999).
135
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For instance, consider the following two cases. In People of Illinois v.
142
Morris, Morris appealed his first-degree murder conviction, arguing that
his counsel was ineffective for failing to request an admissibility hearing
143
with regards to the fingerprint evidence against him. The state’s expert
had testified that a palm print recovered from a bloody shovel found at the
144
crime scene matched Morris’ palm print. The court rejected Morris’ argument, reasoning Morris did not suffer prejudice because, even minus the
fingerprint evidence, “there was still overwhelming evidence that he was
145
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”
This other evidence included that
Morris was angry and acted aggressively towards the victim, was observed
leaving the victim’s house just prior to the discovery of the murder, and that
146
the blood on his clothing matched the victim’s DNA profile.
147

In 2014, in Abdull-Salaam v. Beard, the appellant appealed his convictions for multiple violent offences, claiming recent scientific developments
undermined the “reliability and admissibility” of the fingerprint evidence
148
against him.
The state presented evidence that his prints “matched” a
149
print found on an extension cord wrapper at the crime scene. In rejecting
the argument, the court stated:
Appellant's argument conveniently overlooks that even in the absence of such
fingerprint evidence, there was overwhelming eyewitness testimony placing
Appellant at the scene of the crime. At least four persons who were at the scene
of the crime testified that Appellant shot the police officer…Thus, even if we
were to accept Appellant's argument regarding the fingerprint evidence, Appellant is simply unable to show that the evidence would have altered the outcome
150
of the trial.

Both decisions downplay the impact that fingerprint individualization
evidence would likely have had on the jury. As such, the courts are arguably overlooking that evidence, which is presented as both scientific and capable of concluding that the defendant was present at the crime scene in
terms of absolute certainty, has a highly persuasive impact on jurors. Research suggests statements made by such experts are given “considerable
deference” by jurors and the impact of these statements is likely not to be

142

People v. Morris, 997 N.E.2d 847 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
Id. at 851.
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151

“undone” by cross-examination or rebuttal witnesses.
It is even suggested jurors feel more inclined towards an expert who is subject to a vigorous cross-examination, as opposed to more skeptical about the reliability
152
of his or her evidence.
Case law also demonstrates that the difficulties lawyers may have in resourcing, making and understanding challenges to forensic science evidence
153
are being similarly overlooked. For instance, cases such as United States
154
155
v. Perkins and United States v. Sebbern demonstrate that counsel may
struggle to couch their challenges to the veracity of firearms identification
evidence effectively. Cases like Sebbern also show, along with cases such
156
157
as Thomas v. State and Jones v. United States, that counsel might fail
to do something more specific to challenge firearms identification evidence,
158
such as hire an expert, make an objection, or cross-examine.
All told,
these cases show,
That the courts are acknowledging counsels’ deficiencies but not unpacking
why counsel may have made these inadvertent mistakes or, indeed, strategic
decisions. The reasons why, of course, may be many and varied, but one important rationale courts should not overlook—but seemingly do—is that counsel
159
encounter specific difficulties when engaging with forensic science.

Notably, judges—including those making the appellate decisions in these
cases—can experience similar difficulties to jurors and lawyers. Judges,
160
too, generally lack scientific expertise and technical training.
Some argue that judges generally “do not think like scientists” and therefore have
161
restricted ability to make accurate assessments about science.
As Saks
notes:

151

J. Koehler & Michael J. Saks, Individualization Claims in Forensic Science: Still Unwarranted, 75
BROOK L. REV.1187, 1206 (2010).
152
Dawn McQuiston-Surrett & Michael Saks, Communicating Opinion Evidence in the Forensic Identification Sciences: Accuracy and Impact, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1159, 1188 (2008). Moreover, the adversarial
model means that jurors are not necessarily presented with the full picture. The adversarial model adversarial forces science - in the form of expert testimony - to ‘pick a side’ as scientific evidence is either
presented in favor of the prosecution or the defense narrative. See Cooper, supra note 46, at 6.
153
Cooper, supra note 135.
154
United States v. Perkins, 342 F. App’x. 403 (10th Cir. 2009).
155
United States v. Sebbern, No. 10-CR-87-SLT, 2012 WL 5989813 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2012) (denying
motion to preclude expert testimony).
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Thomas v. State, 155 So. 3d 270 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013).
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Jones v. United States, 27 A.3d 1130 (D.C. 2011).
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United States v. Sebbern, No. 10-CR-87-SLT, 2012 WL 5989813 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2012); Thomas
v. State, 155 So. 3d 270 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013); Jones v. United States, 27 A.3d 1130 (D.C. 2011).
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Just as legal training teaches one the intellectual skills to analyze legal problems, scientific training teaches one how to analyze empirical questions and
proposed answers. This places judges in a weak position to know what questions need to be asked in order to test an empirical claim or how to evaluate the
162
data offered in answer.

Professor Frederic I. Lederer further notes that lawyers’ educational deficiency (when it comes to scientific knowledge) “… often places lawyers at
a disadvantage when confronted with scientific evidence…lawyers often
fail to ask the right questions and uncritically accept scientific asser163
tions.” The NRC Report recognized this was a significant issue as well,
stating that, “lawyers and judges often have insufficient training and background in scientific methodology, and they often fail to fully comprehend
the approaches employed by different forensic science disciplines and the
164
reliability of forensic science evidence . . . .”
The institutions of law and science are two powerful social enterprises.
To divorce either from their social context threatens to undermine their
epistemological legitimacy. Notably, the principle of institutional competence is premised on several assumptions about law and society, including
that “society is capable of functioning rationally when properly guided by
165
law.” This premise requires that relevant institutions possess the “expertise necessary to efficiently manage changing social conditions” and “match
166
society's increasing complexity.” This includes the ability to “distinguish
fairly among competing characteristics of law's social, political, and ideological purposes . . . [and] includes the ability to separate fact from norm
167
when interpreting and applying law.” At present, there is a question mark
over whether key social actors operating in the courts have, on a meaningful
scale, the levels of expertise necessary to accurately address the complexities associated with the scientific uncertainty that numerous forensic science
disciplines, like firearms identification and fingerprint identification, are
168
currently subject to.
As the institution granted competence to address

Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069, 1136 (1999).
Id.
163
Symposium, Scientific Evidence–An Introduction, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 517, 519–20 (1984).
164 NRC REPORT, supra note 38, at 27.
165
Jeffrey Rudd, The Evolution of the Legal Process School's Institutional Competence Theme: Unintended Consequences for Environmental Law, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1045, 1054 (2006).
166
Id.
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Id.
168
It is worth noting that the National Commission on Forensic Science has made steps towards addressing this vacuum. The Commission’s sub-committee for Science and Law Training has recommended the
implementation of a national curriculum aimed at improving the expertise of these social actors (particularly judges and lawyers). See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FORENSIC SCIENCE, FORENSIC SCIENCE
CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT, available at http://www.justice.gov/ncfs/file/795351/download. The
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these complexities, as they are presented in the form of legal challenges, the
courts need to acknowledge these internal deficiencies and take steps towards limiting them.
C. THE ACCEPTANCE OF OUTCOMES GENERATED BY RATIONAL
(YET ILL-SUITED FOR ACCURATELY ASSESSING SCIENTIFIC
UNCERTAINTY) PROCEDURES
The principle of institutional settlement dictates that decisions made by
competent institutions, by way of rational procedures, ought to be accepted
as binding “unless and until they [the procedures] are duly changed.”169
Procedure thus provides a normative dimension to the law, transforming
“law as fact to law as a normative legitimate statement.”170 Procedure is vital to the stability and legitimacy of the law because, inter alia, it provides
the law with a modicum of hindsight, with Eskridge and Frickey noting,
“the substance of decision cannot be planned in advance in the form of rules
and standards,” but “the procedure of decision commonly can be.”171
Legal process theory takes the view that procedure that is “soundly
adapted to the type of power to be exercised is conducive to well-informed
and wise decisions.”172 Because the principle of institutional settlement operates as a principle of justice, attention to the constant improvement of all
of the procedures which depend upon the principle must be paid in an “effort to assure that they yield decisions which are not merely preferable to
the chaos of no decision but are calculated as well . . . to advance the larger
purposes of society.”173
What can be taken from this is that procedures must be reasonably
adapted to the task at hand in order to generate legitimate results. Moreover,
those procedures need not be static – they can (and should) – be amended in
order to reflect social and technological developments in order to better
yield legitimate results. Yet, newly discovered evidence procedures provide
an example of how seemingly rational procedures can, when examined
closely, be ill-suited to producing well-informed and wise decisions.

author has made a number of observations about the proposed curriculum, in particular, that is should
also, in some way, address the needs of law enforcement and jurors given their pivotal role in the criminal justice process. See Cooper, supra note 46, at 21–22.
169
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1, at 2031.
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Rather, when it comes to assessing scientific uncertainty, these procedures
might well invite court decisions that are “ill-informed and unwise.”174
Take the typical make-up of a state newly discovered evidence rule, for
example. Findley summarizes that these rules, “involve some combination
of showings that the new evidence could not have been discovered prior to
trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence; that the evidence is relevant
and not cumulative or merely impeaching; and that the new evidence creates a sufficient probability of a different result at a new trial.”175 A deconstruction of this generic formula shows how these seemingly rationale rules
can be particularly problematic for petitioners using them to obtain relief,
after being convicted in part or whole on the basis of erroneous forensic
science identification evidence.176 As the author has concluded previously,
“petitioners making such claims have a very steep mountain to climb.”177
This steep mountain is exemplified in cases where petitioners have alleged that the criticism aimed at standard tool-mark identification evidence
is newly discovered evidence.178 The appellate courts have responded conservatively to these claims, choosing to (1) defer to lower court decisions
regarding the disqualification of newly discovered evidence i.e., invoke
standard principles of institutional settlement; and (2) not label the findings
of the 2009 NRC Report – including the unprecedented finding that individualization was not proper in forensic disciplines such as firearms identification–as newly discovered evidence.179 These cases show that the shift in
scientific opinion contained in the 2009 NRC Report, with regards to firearms identification evidence, fails to qualify as newly discovered evidence.180 The author has previously concluded this is due largely because
courts take the view that it presents no “new” facts given that it cites to
older research and lacks specificity to individual cases.181 As noted by Cole
and Edmond, the judiciary’s “intense focus on the case, the particular witness, their opinion and its relation to facts in issue . . . .”182 has made it difficult for petitioners to apply general concerns from the 2009 NRC Report
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to “specific case-based evidence relevant to prosecutions and appeals.”183
“Courts are interested in relevant—that is, probative—evidence bearing on
facts in issue in the specific proceedings.”184 As it stands, petitioners are
failing to bridge the gap between the NRC Report’s findings and the impact
they have on the evidence in their cases.185 This failure tends to fail to meet
the requirements of the newly discovered evidence rules.186
The situation is similar in relation to other ‘soft’ forensic science identification methods, namely fingerprint analysis, microscopic hair analysis,
shoe-print analysis, and blood stain pattern analysis. The cases of Johnston
v. State,187 Enderle v. Iowa,188 and Pennsylvania v. Edmiston189 demonstrate
this. Again, these cases show that the demand (by newly discovered evidence rules) for probative evidence that bears on the specific facts at issue
is fatal for newly discovered evidence claims.190 In other words, the sui
generis nature of the rules (and adversarial legal proceedings in general),
has been used to limit the impact of the 2009 NRC Report to support newly
discovered evidence claims based on shifting scientific opinion and/or controversy in various forensic science identification disciplines.
In addition, newly discovered evidence rules present judges with an interpretative task that demands that, to a certain extent, they resolve the relevant scientific uncertainty themselves. For instance, in the course of their
decision-making judges must determine the significance of the alleged scientific uncertainty, the point at which (if possible) it became a ‘new’ school
of thought, and how that time-period relates to questions of diligence and
fact-finding in the instant case before them. The problems that a judge can
face when confronted with a newly discovered evidence claim based on the
argument that ‘new’ developments in fire science undermine an arson conviction, which is based on ‘hallmarks’ of arson being identified at a fire
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scene, provide a good example of how this situation can materialize.191 In
such cases, a judge’s task can be:
Fraught with difficulty, right from the first factual assessment he faces. The
main problem is that there is scientific uncertainty in relation to the veracity of
arson indicators and the assessment of arson fires, and the judge must attempt
to resolve that uncertainty when determining the newly discovered evidence
claim. This is a near impossible challenge for the judge, not in the sense that he
can't make the relevant decision fairly and rationally - but in the sense that he
192
will struggle to make it accurately.

This difficulty likely envelopes the majority of newly discovered evidence claims premised on alleged shifts in scientific opinion, given the very
evolutive nature of the general scientific method and the provisional nature
193
of the products it yields. In other words, definite, accurate and final answers about a particular ‘science’ are extremely hard (if at all possible) to
ascertain.
As demonstrated above, newly discovered evidence procedures routinely
lead to the rejection of newly discovered evidence claims that relate to the
presence of uncertainty in forensic science disciplines. This, in turn, creates
a robust body of precedent that sidelines substantive accuracy, and is applied in a vicious circle. The outcome may be (seemingly) rationally generated, but it is not necessarily substantively accurate.
Procedure should, according to the legal process vision, encompass a
self-corrective function.194 Newly discovered evidence rules need to be examined through a more critical lens when it comes to their ability to facilitate relief in cases presenting credible claims of shifting scientific opinion.
At present, in this context, the courts are preserving a cosmetically rational
procedure that is substantively deficient. As such, courts are exalting form
over substance, which as subsection D explains, is another symptom of loyalty to the legal process vision.

191
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D. THE EXALTION OF FORM OVER SUBSTANCE IN A DESIRE TO
ENGENDER RATIONALITY
Rationality is a key feature of the legal process vision. One way for
courts to engender rationality in their decision-making processes is to engage in reductionism. As Midgley has pointed out, in an intellectual world
195
reductionism offers order and simplicity. The trouble with a largely unreserved desire for rationality through procedure, however, is that it can tend
to “exalt the form over the substance of what is being said, the method over
the aim of an activity, and precision of detail over the completeness of
196
cover.”
The courts can be seen to be taking reductionist approaches to the uncertainty presently pervading certain forensics ‘soft’ science disciplines. They
seemingly take this approach in order to generate rational decision-making
that accounts for the relevant scientific uncertainty and, for all intents and
purposes, resolves it. For instance, we may consider the cases of United
197
198
199
States v. Green, United States v. Monteiro,
United States v. Diaz,
200
201
and United States v. Glynn, and United States v. Taylor. In these cases
the courts have curtailed the testimony of firearms examiners, preventing
them from testifying in terms of absolute certainty and individualization.
The courts in these cases have, instead, required examiners to testify in, allegedly, more diluted terms such as “more likely than not” and “to a rea202
sonable ballistic certainty.”
This approach, which appears to be a judicial attempt to rationalize the
criticism aimed at individualization evidence in the context of firearms
identification, reduces the criticism to a mere issue of terminology. This approach, however, does not resolve the underlying – far more complicated –
problem concerning the currently unknown scientific validity and reliability
203
of individualization claims by firearms examiners. A 2009 study supports
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this point, finding that both judges and jurors are comfortable converting
204
subjective probability evidence into findings of liability. As such, limiting the testimony of firearms examiners (and other such examiners for that
matter) to allegedly more diluted phrases may well not have the desired effect of deterring judges and jurors “from inaccurately thinking there is an
absolute ‘match’ between suspect ammunition and a known weapon. In
other words, this reductionist approach has overlooked relevant social concepts i.e., how the terminology will be interpreted by the social actors in205
volved in the criminal justice process.” The National Commission on Forensic Science’s sub-committee has also chastised the use of these phrases,
206
stating they are meaningless in a scientific sense. Cases such as United
207
States v. Gutierrez-Castro also demonstrate a court taking a reductionist
approach to the complex interaction between judge, jury, and expert. In that
case, the court would not allow the state’s fingerprint identification witness
(who would testify that suspect prints belonged to Gutierrez-Castro) to be
208
referred to as an “expert” in the jury’s presence. This holding reflects a
judicial attempt to engender rationality in its decision-making by endeavor209
ing to respond to the notion that expert labels can easily seduce jurors.
To an extent, therefore, the Gutierrez-Castro decision engages with the social context aspects relevant to the tension between the legal process and
the forensic science at issue. This is important, as, in the context of fingerprint identification, studies have found that a vast majority of jurors agree
that fingerprint identification is a ‘science’ and that fingerprints are the
210
most reliable means of identification. Still, the mere censoring of expert
labels does not necessarily resolve the bigger tension and complex social
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context issue, namely how jurors interpret testimony that, in no uncertain
terms, links a suspect to suspect evidence via a ‘soft’ forensic science. This
is because when jurors engage in decision-making about forensic science
evidence, studies show that, in addition to expert testimony shaping their
thoughts, jurors’ perceptions about the evidence can be shaped by a plethora of other experiences. This includes their prior beliefs and expectations,
value judgments about expert and evidence credibility, the risk of error,
how the forensic evidence aligns with other evidence presented in the case,
211
and how it is popularized and conveyed by the media and other literature.
III. CONCLUSION
The courts demonstrate a systemically conservative approach towards
appellate challenges to the veracity of ‘soft’ forensic science identification
evidence, and claims for access to DNA testing in order to, inter alia, support an application for clemency. Relevant case law reveals that the courts’
approach is underpinned by a fidelity to the legal process vision. In particular, the courts demonstrate (A) a deference to the principle of institutional
settlement; (B) a keenness to protect ‘finality’ interests in order to foreclose
claims for relief; (C) an acceptance of outcomes generated by rational procedures (despite such procedures being ill-suited for making accurate assessments about scientific uncertainty); and (D) an exaltation of form over
substance in an attempt to engender rationality when faced with scientific
uncertainty. Collectively, these themes are consistent with the legal process
vision. Unfortunately, however, they can invariably sideline notions of substantive accuracy.
This article confirms the existence of these legal process-centric themes
in relevant case law and has considered possible implications. It is important to consider, however, that these themes are not insular, but rather interrelated. For instance, the principle of institutional settlement is the cornerstone feature of all four themes given. Each one focuses on procedure, the
preservation of competent institutional decisions, precedent, and the generation of rationality to varying extents. The notion that science is divorced
from its social context by the legal process vision in this context similarly
pervades each theme. Finality is not only visible in the courts’ selection of
specific ‘interests’ to rationalize their rejections of claims, but is also reflected in the high thresholds for relief embodied in newly discovered evi-
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dence rules (and beyond). Moreover, newly discovered evidence rules are
not the only seemingly rational post-conviction procedures that produce
substantively questionable results in terms of how they guide the assessment of scientific uncertainty. The Daubert standard212 – regulating the admissibility of the vast majority of expert evidence across America – is open
to the same criticism. In addition, the notion that courts exalt form over
substance goes beyond reductionist approaches to expert terminology and
labels, but also comprises ‘finality’ which is, in the end, an umbrella term
for a variety of complex interests, and therefore also a reductionist concept.
This complicated web of legal process theory-associated ideas has a significant influence on the practical application of the law. An emphasis on
process does, indeed, assist the law to maintain social order, stability, rationality and predictability. These are all fundamental, important features
that should be preserved. However, it is now certain that rational, consistent
and well-intentioned procedures can generate substantively erroneous results. As such, the courts (and other institutions) should have a closer eye
on substance and, in particular, the substantive accuracy that can be approximated, to varying degrees, by progressing scientific thought.
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